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Privacy-Preserving Vehicle Assignment for Mobility-on-Demand Systems
Amanda Prorok and Vijay Kumar
Abstract—Urban transportation is being transformed by
mobility-on-demand (MoD) systems. One of the goals of MoD
systems is to provide personalized transportation services to
passengers. This process is facilitated by a centralized operator
that coordinates the assignment of vehicles to individual pas-
sengers, based on location data. However, current approaches
assume that accurate positioning information for passengers
and vehicles is readily available. This assumption raises privacy
concerns. In this work, we address this issue by proposing a
method that protects passengers’ drop-off locations (i.e., their
travel destinations). Formally, we solve a batch assignment
problem that routes vehicles at obfuscated origin locations
to passenger locations (since origin locations correspond to
previous drop-off locations), such that the mean waiting time
is minimized. Our main contributions are two-fold. First,
we formalize the notion of privacy for continuous vehicle-
to-passenger assignment in MoD systems, and integrate a
privacy mechanism that provides formal guarantees. Second, we
present a scalable algorithm that takes advantage of superfluous
(idle) vehicles in the system, combining multiple iterations of
the Hungarian algorithm to allocate a redundant number of
vehicles to a single passenger. As a result, we are able to
reduce the performance deterioration induced by the privacy
mechanism. We evaluate our methods on a real, large-scale
data set consisting of over 11 million taxi rides (specifying
vehicle availability and passenger requests), recorded over a
month’s duration, in the area of Manhattan, New York. Our
work demonstrates that privacy can be integrated into MoD
systems without incurring a significant loss of performance,
and moreover, that this loss can be further minimized at the
cost of deploying additional (redundant) vehicles into the fleet.
I. INTRODUCTION
The availability of Location-Based Services (LBS) is
transforming a wide variety of applications. This develop-
ment is being fueled by the increasing use of personal mobile
communication devices (smart phones) that are endowed
with positioning sensors, such as GPS. Importantly, the
availability of precise positioning information in dense urban
settings, and the joint decrease in communication costs, has
paved the way for mobility-on-demand systems (MoD), such
as Lyft 1 and Uber 2. The potential of improved urban
mobility systems has been largely acknowledged due to the
possibility of reducing congestion, vehicle service cost and
emissions [13]. Importantly, such services also respond to
the needs of individuals, for example by reducing travel
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Fig. 1. Topological representation of Manhattan as computed by our
framework described in Sec. III. The edges of the graph are colored to
represent the expected traversal speed. We zoom into the area around the
Flatiron building, located at 40°44’ 27.8196” N 73°59’ 22.9164” W.
cost (through vehicle-sharing) and reducing waiting times
(through centralized vehicle coordination) [2].
However, the use of LBS to facilitate MoD services
poses a privacy threat to the individual participants. Indeed,
vehicles reporting the exact coordinates of a user’s drop-off
location (travel destination) may reveal sensitive information
about the user’s habits, and hence, may deter users from us-
ing such systems. Consequently, we ask ourselves what were
to happen if vehicle locations were not reported precisely,
but rather imprecisely. Indeed, by perturbing the vehicle
locations, it is expected that the user will enjoy greater
privacy — at the cost of a loss of service quality. Hence,
our goal is to propose a solution that protects user travel
destinations, thus ensuring privacy, while simultaneously
minimizing the loss of MoD service quality.
In this work, we consider a fleet of vehicles and passengers
demanding to be picked up at specific locations. We pose this
problem as a batch assignment of vehicles to passengers,
similar to the approach taken in [2]. This assignment is
facilitated by a centralized operator that collects all customer
requests, i.e. the locations at which a vehicle is requested.
Once a passenger is assigned a vehicle, she communicates
her travel destination to her vehicle (by-passing the central
operator). Upon completion of the passenger transport, the
vehicle immediately communicates its availability to the
central operator and specifies its current location. Since doing
so would compromise the passenger’s travel destination (i.e.,
the current vehicle position is equal to the dropped-off
passenger’s destination), we develop an assignment strategy
that deals with obfuscated vehicle origin locations.
Although the origin of privacy research stems from the
domains of database theory and statistics [1, 6], it has
matured to the point of gaining significant traction in many
cross-disciplinary domains, including social networking [16],
the Internet of Things [17], and robotics [12]. However, we
are unaware of its application to the MoD problem. Indeed,
most literature in the domain of MoD systems focuses
on the questions of load re-balancing and predictive posi-
tioning [9–11, 15], and vehicle assignment with passenger
pooling [2, 13].
The contributions of our work are summarized as fol-
lows. First, we formalize the notion of privacy for con-
tinuous vehicle-to-passenger assignment in MoD systems.
The key insight is that vehicle origin locations correspond
to previous passenger drop-off locations. Building on prior
work in location privacy, we combine the notion of geo-
indistinguishability with the batch vehicle assignment prob-
lem to ensure private vehicle origin locations. Based on
this framework, we quantify the effect of privacy on the
performance of the system, as measured by mean passenger
waiting times. Subsequently, we present an algorithm that
takes advantage of superfluous vehicles in the system and
effectively reduces the performance deterioration induced by
the privacy mechanism. Our methods are evaluated on a
real, large-scale data set consisting of over 11 million taxi
rides (specifying vehicle availability and passenger requests),
recorded in the area of Manhattan, New York. Our main
insight is that the loss of performance induced by privacy
is small, and furthermore, this loss can be minimized at the
cost of deploying additional vehicles.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a batch that consists of M passengers,
each requesting one vehicle, and N available vehicles. We
model the transport network via a weighted directed graph,
G = (V , E ,W). Vertices in the set V represent geographic
locations, where a node i has a position xi ∈ R
2. Nodes
i and j are connected by an edge if (i, j) ∈ E . A weight
wij ∈ W quantifies the cost of traversing this edge — we
assume this cost to be equal to the time needed to reach node
j from node i. We assume the graph G is a strongly connected
graph, i.e., a path exists between any pair of vertices. At the
beginning of each assignment epoch, vehicles are located at
nodes v ∈ VN , and passengers are located at nodes p ∈ VM .
Hence, the positions of a vehicle i and a passenger j are
given by xvi and xpj , respectively. The vehicle-to-passenger
assignment is denoted by a binary matrix A ∈ {0, 1}N×M ,
which is constrained by
∑N
i aij ≤ 1 and
∑M
j aij ≤ 1
and
∑N
i
∑M
j aij = min(N,M). In other words, we assign
D = 1 vehicles to each passenger, and call this our non-
redundant scheme 3. We capture the cost for vehicle i to
travel to a passenger j by a matrixC ∈ RN×M with elements
cij . Finally, we measure the performance of our assignment
strategy by considering the waiting times until pick-up, given
by cij where aij = 1 for all passengers j ∈ 1, . . . ,M .
Once a vehicle has picked-up and transported a passenger
to her desired location, the vehicle notifies the central op-
erator that it is available by communicating its obfuscated
position. This position corresponds to the vehicle’s origin
for the subsequent assignment epoch, with the true (non-
obfuscated) value equal to the previous passenger’s travel
destination. Our problem can now be stated as follows.
Problem 1. Design a method that routes vehicles to passen-
gers, while minimizing average passenger waiting times, and
while guaranteeing a desired level of privacy for passenger
travel destinations.
III. MANHATTAN TAXICAB DATASET
We focus the evaluations of our work on the geographical
area of Manhattan, and rely on a public dataset of New
York City yellow taxicab operation to provide us with real
passenger demand and vehicle availability information 4.
The dataset was collected during the month of June, 2016,
and consists of 11 million taxi rides. The data specifies the
time and location of pick-up and drop-off, as well as trip
distance and fare. In order to facilitate the evaluation of our
methods, we create a graph of Manhattan by accessing actual
street networks from OpenStreetMap 5 [4]. Our topological
representation of Manhattan consists of 4302 nodes and
9414 edges. In order to deploy algorithms based on this
representation, we first define the cost of traversing any edge
in this graph. In the context of transportation, an intuitive
cost function is given by the expected travel time. Hence,
we use the pick-up and drop-off locations listed in the June,
2016, dataset to compute all trajectories taken, assuming
that the shortest path (length-wise) was chosen. We associate
each trajectory with the listed travel time. Each edge of the
trajectory is assigned a travel time proportional to its length.
After processing all trajectories, we can compute the mean
travel time wij of each edge (i, j) in the graph. Figure 1
shows the resulting expected travel times for all edges in the
graph of Manhattan.
In order to solve the assignment problem, in the remainder
of this work, we assemble passenger requests and vehi-
cle availabilities into batches that consider 20 second time-
windows. Figure 2 shows data collected on Friday June 1st,
2016. We process the ride data to show the number of new
passenger requests per batch. The data shows how demand
peaks during the morning and late afternoon rush hours, with
fluctuations at lunch time.
3For a redundant assignment with D > 1 (and where N > M ), we
have
∑N
i aij ≤ 1 and
∑M
j aij ≥ 1 and M ≤
∑N
i
∑M
j aij ≤ N . The
performance is then measured as the mean waiting time until pick-up by
the fastest vehicle.
4NYC Taxi & Limousine Commission, Trip Record Data, http://
www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/about/trip_record_data.
shtml
5http://www.openstreetmap.org
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Fig. 2. Analysis of Manhattan taxicab dataset for data collected on Friday
June 1st, 2016. From all rides recorded in that 24 h time-interval, we only
select rides that start and end on the island of Manhattan. We show the
number of passenger pick-ups made per 20 s intervals (green curve). We
also show the total number of occupied taxis at any given moment (blue
curve). The data is smoothed over 30min rolling windows, and the shaded
areas show the corresponding standard deviations.
IV. BACKGROUND
In the following, we review the notions of location privacy
upon which we build our methodology. Several approaches
to location privacy have been proposed thus far — a
comprehensive review is offered in [3, 8]. Most of these
methods, however, assume that the adversary’s prior belief
(side information) is known, and are explicitly modeled on
this assumption [14]. Such approaches have the downside
that any inconsistency or change in the attacker’s side
information leads to an immediate threat (and privacy is
no longer guaranteed). Indeed, a much stronger definition
of privacy is one that is independent of any current or
future attacker model. Consequently, there has been much
interest in differentially private formalisms that abstract from
adversary’s side information [6].
A. Differential Privacy
Stemming from the domain of statistical databases, the
goal of differential privacy is to protect individual entries in
a given database (in our case, passenger drop-off locations),
while simultaneously allowing aggregate information about
the database to be released through a query (in our case,
a query that outputs the vehicles’ origin locations). The
key requirement is that changing an individual’s entry in
the database (i.e., a vehicle origin location that corresponds
to a specific passenger drop-off location) should not have
a significant affect on the outcome of the query. More
formally, if the probability that a query returns a value from
a database lies within an eǫ multiplicative bound of the
probability that the same query returns the same value from
an adjacent database 6, then the query is said to produce
ǫ-indistinguishable outcomes [7]. Notably, this definition is
void of any threat model, and hence, is independent of any
side information that the attacker might own. In order to
preserve ǫ-indistinguishability, privacy mechanisms consist
6Two databases are adjacent if they differ by one entry.
of adding random noise (commonly drawn from a Laplace
distribution) to the query output.
B. Geo-Indistinguishability
The location privacy formalism put forward by Andres et
al. [3], termed geo-indistinguishability, is a generalization of
differential privacy to the metric domain. In the following, we
introduce the main concepts with an adapted notation. Geo-
indistinguishability considers a query that exposes a position
x from a database. The privacy leakage can be formulated
as
L = sup
x,x′
∣∣∣∣ln P(x˜|x)P(x˜|x′)
∣∣∣∣ (1)
where x is a true position stored in the original database, x′
is the corresponding altered position stored in an adjacent
database, and x˜ is an obfuscated position. The idea of geo-
indistinguishability is to ensure that two positions x and x′
are indistinguishable when they are close to each other. In
other words, a user enjoys ǫr-privacy within a radius r, if
any two locations that are at most r apart produce query
results with similar distributions.
Definition 1 (Adapted from Def. 3.1 [3]: Geo-indistinguisha-
bility). A mechanism that returns x˜, for a given x or a given
x′, satisfies ǫ-geo-indistinguishability iff for all x and x′:
L = sup
x,x′
∣∣∣∣ln P(x˜|x)P(x˜|x′)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ||x− x′||2 (2)
Building on prior results [5], the authors argue that the
obfuscated position x˜ is to be drawn from a two-dimensional
Laplace distribution inversely scaled by ǫ, and centered at
x. Formally, we have that x˜ ∼ L(x, ǫ), and we define the
corresponding probability density function as PL(x˜|x, ǫ). In
order to satisfy ǫ-geo-indistinguishability, we implement this
proposed privacy mechanism 7.
Fig. 3 demonstrates the effect of this mechanism, applied
to the coordinates of the Flatiron building in Manhattan. We
observe how, as the scale of the Laplacian increases (i.e., ǫ
decreases), the noise (and hence privacy) increases. In the
context of vehicle routing, it becomes clear that increased
privacy comes at the cost of performance deterioration due to
an obfuscation of vehicle positions that leads to suboptimal
vehicle routing. In the following sections, we discuss this
effect and propose a method that enables a minimization of
this loss of performance.
V. BATCH VEHICLE ROUTING UNDER PRIVACY
The goal is to assign and route vehicles to passengers such
that each passenger is picked up, while minimizing the total
assignment cost. We formalize this vehicle routing problem
as finding the optimal assignment solution A⋆:
A⋆ = argmin
A
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
cijaij (3)
7We note that Th. 4.1 of [3] proves that under double precision with 16
significant digits, the discretization of noisy data points onto a grid does
not incur a loss of privacy.
(a) ǫ = 0.005 (b) ǫ = 0.01 (c) ǫ = 0.02 (d) ǫ = 0.05 (e) ǫ = 0.1
Fig. 3. A sub-area of Manhattan, centered around the Flatiron building located at 40°44’ 27.8196” N 73°59’ 22.9164” W. We draw 100 position samples
from a two-dimensional Laplacian with inverse scale ǫ, centered around the Flatiron building. The random samples are subsequently projected to the nearest
vertices on the associated graph (shown in red), where the size of the node corresponds to the multiplicity of projected samples at that node.
with constraints
∑N
i aij ≤ 1 and
∑M
j aij ≤ 1 and∑N
i
∑M
j aij = min(N,M). The element a
⋆
ij of matrix
A⋆ specifies whether the final solution routes vehicle i to
passenger j.
The system above is a linear sum assignment problem,
also known as the problem of minimum weight matching
in bipartite graphs. We use the Hungarian algorithm (or
Kuhn-Munkres algorithm), to solve the system and find an
optimal assignment A⋆. This assignment is deterministic,
and vehicles follow the shortest path (or one of the shortest
paths, if several exist) to reach their assigned passenger.
To compute the elements cij of the cost matrix C, we
consider the cost incurred when routing a vehicle located at
a node i to a passenger located at a node j. The cost of this
path is given by the sum of the weights of edges that lie on
it
f(i, j) =
∑
(k,l)∈Sij
wkl, (4)
where Sij is the set of edges in the shortest path between
node i and node j, and wkl ∈ W is the weight of an edge
(k, l). We can now compute the cost for all possible vehicle-
to-passenger assignments
cij = f(vi, pj), ∀i, j (5)
and subsequently solve system (3).
A. Solving the Assignment Problem under Obfuscation
Our goal is to increase the privacy of vehicle origin
locations (we remind the reader that the vehicle origin and
the previous passenger drop-off locations are the same). We
do this by implementing the privacy mechanism described
in Sec. IV-B to produce obfuscated (noisy) vehicle origin
locations, denoted by xv˜i for all vehicles i = 1, . . . , N —
i.e., xv˜i ∼ L(xvi , ǫ). We compute the expected cost c˜ij of
routing a vehicle from a probable node vi to a true passenger
location pj , given that the vehicle is located around a noisy
position xv˜i generated by a planar Laplace distribution with
inverse scale parameter ǫ:
c˜ij = E[cij ] = η
∑
k∈V
PL(xv˜i |k, ǫ)f(k, pj). (6)
where η is a normalization constant.
We adapt the original objective in (3) to account for the
expected cost:
A˜
⋆ = argmin
A
E
[
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
cijaij
]
= argmin
A
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
E[cij ]aij . (7)
We note that, since the cost values c˜ij are noisy, this
assignment produces a suboptimal assignment A˜⋆ with re-
spect to the true vehicle origin locations. We measure the
performance of this assignment by considering the passenger
waiting times cij with a˜
⋆
ij = 1, where cij corresponds to
the effective waiting time (based on the true, non-obfuscated
vehicle origins).
Proposition 1 (ǫ-geo-indistinguishable batch assignment).
The batch assignment where each vehicle i reports an obfus-
cated position xv˜i drawn from a planar Laplace distribution
is ǫ-geo-indistinguishable with respect to the true positions
xvi .
Proof. Given a query that reports the current set of vehicle
positions, the leakage formula can be written as:
L = sup
i,xvi ,xv′i
∣∣∣∣∣ln
P(xv˜1 , ... ,xv˜N |xv1 , ... ,xvN )
P(xv˜1 , ... ,xv˜N |xv1 , ... ,xv′i , ... ,xvN )
∣∣∣∣∣ (8)
where xv′
i
represents an alternative position for vehicle i. The
numerator refers to the database containing all true positions,
while the denominator refers to an adjacent database where
the position of a single vehicle has been changed. By the
definition of ǫ-geo-indistinguishability (cf. Section IV-B) and
since all obfuscated positions are independent, we obtain:
L = sup
i,xvi ,xv′i
∣∣∣∣∣ln
P(xv˜i |xvi)
P(xv˜i |xv′i)
∣∣∣∣∣ (9)
≤ ǫ sup
i,xvi ,xv′i
‖xvi − xv′i‖2
B. Redundant Vehicle Assignment
Vehicle-to-passenger assignments that are based on obfus-
cated positions will result in degraded performance. Much
of this performance loss can be recovered by realizing that,
in practice, a large proportion of the vehicle fleet is idle 8.
8http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/
2014_taxicab_fact_book.pdf
Algorithm 1 Iterative Hungarian Assignment under Obfuscation
1: c˜ij ⇐ η
∑
k∈V
PL(xv˜i |k, ǫ)f(k, pj) ∀i, j
2: A˜⋆ ⇐ argmin
A
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
c˜ijaij
3: for {2, . . . , D} do
4: if N < MD then
5: break
6: end if
7: Zj ⇐ {i|a
⋆
ij = 1}
8: c˜ij ⇐


+∞ if ∃j′ s.t. i ∈ Zj′
η
∑
k∈V|Zj |+1
min
k∈k
f(k, pj)
∏
{k,i′}∈zip(k,Zj∪{i})
PL(xv˜i′ |k, ǫ)
9: A˜⋆ ⇐ A˜⋆ + argmin
A˜
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
c˜ijaij
10: end for
Our idea is to assign redundant vehicles to each passenger:
of all assigned vehicles, only the fastest vehicle will actually
pick up the passenger. Consequently, this strategy reduces
the expected passenger waiting time (with respect to the non-
redundant assignment strategy) 9.
Algorithm 1 proposes a polynomial-time procedure that
assigns D vehicles to each passenger. When D > 1, we
refer to the assignment as redundant. The key component of
this algorithm is that it computes the optimal assignment of
(several) idle vehicles to each passenger based on a cost
matrix that is built incrementally (with each additionally
assigned vehicle). Lines 1 and 2 compute the solution to
the basic non-redundant assignment, as seen in the previous
section. At each iteration (starting on line 3), the procedure
adds an additional vehicle to each passenger such that the
expected sum of waiting times is minimized. On line 7, the
set Zj contains the indeces of the currently assigned vehicles
for passenger j. Line 8 computes the expected waiting time
resulting from assigning an additional vehicle i to each
passenger j 10. It does so by evaluating the joint probability
that all already assigned vehicles and the additional vehicle
are located at a given set of nodes k, and multiplying this
probability by the minimum waiting time (given by the node
in k closest to the passenger). Line 9 combines the previous
assignment with the newly optimized one. It is worth noting
that line 8 can be computed quickly (i) by memorizing
the results of the previous iteration for the next, (ii) by
ignoring nodes that have a minor impact on the computation
of c˜ij (e.g., nodes k such that PL(xv˜i |k, ǫ) ≤ pmin for
some arbitrary threshold pmin, and (iii) by pre-computing for
each node in the graph, this list of relevant nodes (nearest
9The underlying reasoning is that for two random variables X and
Y representing passenger pick-up times, we have that E[min(X, Y )] ≤
min(E[X],E[Y ]).
10zip(A,B) corresponds to the list of pairs obtained by combining
elements of A and B in the same order (with |A| = |B|). E.g.,
zip({{1, 2}, {3, 4}}) = {{1, 3}, {2, 4}}).
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Fig. 4. Passenger waiting times for batch vehicle-to-passenger assignment,
for 500 vehicles and 250 passengers. Passenger and vehicle locations
are sampled according to the actual distribution of pick-up and drop-off
locations, respectively, over the month of June 2016. The dashed line shows
the mean. (a) Optimal assignment strategy. (b) Private assignment using
geo-indistinguishable vehicle origins, with ǫ = 0.02. (c) Private assignment
using geo-indistinguishable vehicle origins, with ǫ = 0.01.
nodes given the latter threshold), and their shortest route
lengths to every other node in the graph. Hence, the overall
complexity is bounded by the Hungarian algorithm, and
is in the order of O((min(M2N,N2M) + MNDs(V))D)
where s(V) = maxk∈V |{l|l ∈ V ∨ PL(l|k, ǫ) > pmin}|
represents the size of largest set of vertices that contribute
minimally (as determined by pmin) to the computation of the
expected waiting times. For example, setting pmin = 10
−6
with ǫ = 0.02 results in s(V) = 30 on the Manhattan graph.
C. Performance
The following results are based on the dataset and graph
described in Section III, and show the performance of the
batch assignment strategy for varying levels of noise, and a
varying number of available vehicles. Fig. 4 shows passenger
waiting times for 500 vehicles and 250 passengers, obtained
after non-redundant single-vehicle assignments. Passenger
and vehicle locations are sampled according to the actual
distribution of pick-up and drop-off locations, respectively,
as recorded over the month of June 2016. Using an optimal
(noise-free) assignment algorithm, the mean waiting time
is just under 1 minute. We observe that as the noise level
increases, the distribution shifts, resulting in higher mean
waiting times.
Fig. 5 shows the performance of the batch assignment al-
gorithm, as a function of the Laplace inverse scale parameter
ǫ, for a fixed number of 250 passengers. We consider non-
redundant as well as redundant assignments (the number of
vehicles assigned per passenger is denoted by D). For all
panels, the left side shows the average waiting time, and the
right side shows the degradation in performance between
the private (suboptimal) assignment and the non-private
(optimal) assignment (also shown by a dashed line on the
left panel). Figures (a), and (b) use 250, and 1000 vehicles
respectively. As expected, the mean waiting time decreases
as the number of available vehicles increases. Consequently,
as the proportion of available vehicles to passenger increases,
the performance of the private assignment strategy deviates
more strongly from the optimal performance (since the noise
is constant, and the vehicle density increases).
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(a) 250 vehicles
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(b) 1000 vehicles
Fig. 5. Performance of the batch assignment algorithm for 250 passengers
and a varying number of vehicles. Passenger and vehicle locations are sam-
pled according to the actual distribution of pick-up and drop-off locations,
respectively, over the month of June 2016. The left panels show the mean
waiting time, as a function of the Laplacian inverse scale parameter ǫ. The
dashed line shows the optimal performance. The shaded areas represent a
95% confidence interval. The right panels show the percentage of waiting
time increase, with respect to the optimal assignment strategy. The value D
is the number of assigned vehicles per passenger, as elaborated in Sec. V-B
VI. CONTINUOUS VEHICLE ROUTING UNDER PRIVACY
In practice, after a vehicle has dropped off its passenger,
it becomes available again for another assignment batch.
We refer to consecutive assignments of the same vehicle
to consecutive passengers as continuous vehicle routing. In
contrast to batch vehicle routing, continuous vehicle routing
poses the additional challenge of ensuring that the obfuscated
drop-off locations are reported at times that correspond to
the travel distances between reported (obfuscated) locations.
In other words, a vehicle effectively reports its availability
at a moment in time that is either before or after it truly
drops off its passenger, since reporting its availability at the
true moment would compromise the privacy of the drop-off
location. In the following, we demonstrate that the contin-
uous vehicle assignment strategy respects promised privacy
guarantees. We elaborate the strategy for non-redundant as
well as redundant assignments.
A. Continuous Non-Redundant Vehicle Assignment
The procedure according to which a vehicle is routed to
a passenger in the private continuous assignment scheme is
as follows. At the start, the vehicle communicates with the
operator to report its obfuscated position, and to receive its
next passenger assignment. Once this assignment is known,
the vehicle directly communicates with the passenger (by-
passing the central operator) to obtain the true passenger
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(a) Operation diagram for continuous non-redundant assign-
ment. Once assigned to a passenger, a vehicle will become
available in t = tp + td seconds. However, to preserve
the privacy mechanism, it will report its availability after
t˜ = t˜p+ t˜d seconds (irrespective of whether that time arrives
earlier or later than its true availability).
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(b) Operation diagram for continuous redundant assignment.
Once assigned to a passenger, vehicles 1 and 2 mutually
agree upon which vehicle will effectively pick up the passen-
ger (in this case, vehicle 1). After t˜1 = t˜1,p + t˜1,d seconds,
the selected vehicle drops the passenger off at the request
site L1), but reports an obfuscated drop-off location ▽1. The
other vehicle pretends to pick up the passenger by moving to
L2 and reporting the same drop-off as vehicle 1 at ▽1 = ▽2
after t˜2 = t˜2,p + t˜2,d seconds.
Fig. 6. Continuous assignment scheme. True positions are denoted by filled
black symbols. Reported (obfuscated) positions are denoted by empty white
symbols. The previous true and reported drop-off locations are shown with
circles (i.e., •, ◦), the pick-up location is shown with a square (i.e., ) and
the new true and reported drop-off locations are shown with triangles (i.e.,
L, ▽, respectively). Note that all vehicles sample new offsets from the their
true and reported positions according to a planar Laplace distribution with
inverse-scale parameter ǫ.
destination. Based on this information, the vehicle computes
an obfuscated drop-off location (by adding planar Laplace
noise) and the moment in time when this fictitious location
will be reached (i.e., when the vehicle availability must be
reported). Figure 6(a) illustrates this procedure on a two-
dimensional workspace, showing the offset produced by the
privacy mechanism, and its effect on the travel time. Since
the vehicle availability, as reported to the operator, might
happen before the actual vehicle availability, it is important
that vehicles do not keep an ever increasing backlog of
passenger requests. However, since obfuscated drop-off po-
sitions are sampled from unbiased probability distributions,
there is no bias towards reporting availability sooner rather
than later, and the backlog effect does not happen in practice.
For clarity, the following formulations use the symbols
defined in the Fig. 6, where • and ◦ represent real and
obfuscated origin locations, and where L and ▽ represent
real and obfuscated drop-off locations, respectively.
Proposition 2 (ǫ-geo-indistinguishable continuous non-re-
dundant assignment). The continuous non-redundant assign-
ment where each vehicle i reports an obfuscated position
◦i drawn from a planar Laplace distribution is ǫ-geo-
indistinguishable with respect to the true positions •i iff, at
each drop-off, each vehicle draws a new obfuscated position
▽i from a planar Laplace distribution centered around the
true drop-off Li (we assume that each passenger makes a
single ride).
Proof. The proof follows a similar structure to the one
of Proposition 1. Since the query only returns the last
obfuscated position of all vehicles (and a passenger takes
a single ride), we have:
L =sup
∣∣∣∣∣ln
P(◦1, ... , ◦i,▽i, ... , ◦N , t˜|•1, ... , •i,Li, ... , •N)
P(◦1, ... , ◦i,▽i, ... , ◦N , t˜|•1, ... , •i,L′i, ... , •N)
∣∣∣∣∣
(10)
where Li refers to the latest drop-off location of vehicle i, and
L
′
i refers to an alternative drop-off location. The duration t˜
(known to the operator) refers to the reported duration of the
latest ride of vehicle i. As shown in Figure 6(a), this duration
is fully determined by the previously and currently reported
drop-off locations. Hence, if we assume independence of
pick-up and drop-off locations, we obtain:
L = sup
∣∣∣∣∣ln
P(◦i,▽i, t˜|•i,Li)
P(◦i,▽i, t˜|•i,L′i)
∣∣∣∣∣ (11)
= sup
∣∣∣∣∣ln
P(t˜|◦i,▽i)P(◦i|•i)P(▽i|Li)
P(t˜|◦i,▽i)P(◦i|•i)P(▽i|L′i)
∣∣∣∣∣
= sup
∣∣∣∣ln P(▽i|Li)P(▽i|L′i)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ · sup ‖Li − L′i‖2
Remark 1. This proof assumes the independence of pick-
up and drop-off locations. In reality, it is often possible to
correlate the pick-up and drop-off locations given the time
of day. As a result, it may be necessary to vary the level of
obfuscation throughout the day by tuning ǫ as a function of
the pick-up location.
Remark 2. Passengers who take n subsequent rides only
benefit from an nǫ-geo-indistinguishable drop-off (since ob-
fuscated positions are independent from each other). In prac-
tice, this leakage can be reduced by correlating subsequent
obfuscated positions that relate to a given same passenger.
B. Continuous Redundant Vehicle Assignment
Much like the redundant batch assignment strategy, contin-
uous assignment can also be implemented with a redundant
number of vehicles per passenger. This procedure is schema-
tized in Figure 6(b). In contrast to Figure 6(a), Figure 6(b)
shows two vehicles that are assigned to pick up a passenger.
The vehicles will mutually agree upon which one will truly
pick up the passenger (i.e., the one that is truly closer). The
selected vehicle computes an obfuscated drop-off location,
and communicates this value to the redundant vehicle, which
uses it to compute its itinerary (to a fake drop-off location).
At the end of the respective travel times, both vehicles report
their availability as well as the same obfuscated drop-off
location (this operation is not synchronized).
Proposition 3 (ǫ-geo-indistinguishable continuous redundant
assignment). The continuous redundant assignment where
each vehicle i reports an obfuscated position ◦i drawn from
a planar Laplace distribution is ǫ-geo-indistinguishable with
respect to the true positions •i iff vehicles that are assigned
to the same passenger report the same drop-off location. At
each drop-off, each vehicle draws a new obfuscated position
(we assume that each passenger makes a single ride).
Proof. We illustrate the proof for a two-vehicle assignment
where the vehicle i picks up the passenger and drops her off
at position Li (refer to Figure 6(b)). Similarly to the previous
proof, we obtain:
L = sup
∣∣∣∣ln P(◦i, ◦j ,▽i,j , t˜i, t˜j |•i, •j ,Li)
P(◦i, ◦j ,▽i,j , t˜i, t˜j |•i, •j ,L′i)
∣∣∣∣ (12)
= sup
∣∣∣∣ln P(t˜i|◦i,▽i,j)P(t˜j |◦j ,▽i,j)P(◦i|•i)P(◦j |•j)P(▽i,j |Li)
P(t˜i|◦i,▽i,j)P(t˜j |◦j ,▽i,j)P(◦i|•i)P(◦j |•j)P(▽i,j |L′i)
∣∣∣∣
= sup
∣∣∣∣ln P(▽i,j |Li)P(▽i,j |L′i)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ · sup ‖Li − L′i‖j
The same holds if vehicle j picks the passenger up.
C. Performance
The following results are based on the dataset and graph
described in Section III. We show the performance of the
continuous assignment strategy (for a constant privacy level,
given by ǫ = 0.02) applied to the data recorded during
the 24 hours of Friday 1st, June 2016. The total vehicle
fleet size is variable throughout time — since the taxicab
dataset contains records of occupied vehicles only, we make
use of a heuristic to compute the total number of vehicles
in the fleet (occupied plus available vehicles). This value
is computed from the number of occupied rides obtained
from the real taxi data, and is multiplied by 1.56 (which
corresponds to a ratio of 64% of occupied taxis 11). We
cap the maximum fleet size at 6000 vehicles. At each time
step of our simulation, we ensure that the vehicle fleet size
corresponds to the precomputed vehicle fleet size. When
necessary, we add vehicles to the system— these vehicles are
placed at random locations that correspond to the distribution
of drop-off locations derived from the real dataset. We use the
real recorded passenger pick-up times to represent the times
when vehicles are requested. Requests are batched into 20 s
intervals. If requests are not serviced in the current batch,
they roll over to the next one, and those that are not serviced
within 20min are dropped (all schemes exhibit a drop rate
below 0.01%). Finally, we solve the assignment problem
for each batch of requests. Vehicles are continuously routed
according to our strategies, and they remain in the system
unless removed (when the precomputed fleet size reduces).
Figure 7 shows the results in the form of violin plots that
represent the distribution of the underlying data (i.e., one
11http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/
2014_taxicab_fact_book.pdf
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Fig. 7. Performance of our assignment algorithms applied to the taxicab
data recorded during the 24 hours of Friday 1st, June 2016, and processed as
described in Sec. VI-C. The violin plots feature a kernel density estimation
of the underlying data distribution, and are obtained using the Scott reference
rule to compute the kernel bandwidth. The plots also show the median,
the 25th and 75th percentiles. The mean and standard deviation for the
non-private scheme are: 180.937 ± 247.619 [s]; for the private redundant
scheme: 191.381±194.309 [s]; and for the private non-redundant scheme:
233.929 ± 263.267 [s].
data point corresponds to the waiting time of a passenger
until pick-up). We show the performance of the continuous
non-redundant and redundant assignment schemes, and, to
benchmark our results, we also show the performance of
the optimal (non-private) assignment algorithm. In the re-
dundant scheme, for each batch, we choose the number of
redundant assignments D such there is at least 1 vehicle per
passenger, and such that a sufficient number of vehicles is left
unassigned (to account for the next batch of requests). The
private non-redundant scheme is 30% worse than the optimal
assignment scheme with an average waiting time increase of
53 s; the redundant scheme improves over the non-redundant
scheme and is only 6% worse that the optimal assignment
scheme, with an average waiting time increase of 11 s.
VII. CONCLUSION
This work is situated in the context of centrally oper-
ated MoD systems, and considers the problem of assigning
vehicles to passengers such that the mean waiting time is
minimized. In specific, we provide a method that solves
the assignment problem under obfuscated vehicle origin
positions, such that the destinations of previously dropped-
off passengers remains private. Our main contributions are
two-fold. First, we formalized the notion of privacy for
continuous vehicle-to-passenger assignment by building on
the concept of geo-indistinguishability. Second, to minimize
performance loss, we presented an algorithm that takes
advantage of superfluous vehicles in the system, combining
multiple iterations of the Hungarian algorithm to allocate
a redundant number of vehicles to a single passenger. We
evaluated our method on a real, large-scale dataset consisting
of over 11 million taxi rides (specifying vehicle availability
and passenger requests). Our results show that our privacy-
preserving redundant assignment strategy successfully mini-
mizes the loss of quality-of-service, as measured by average
passenger waiting times. Our work demonstrates that privacy
can be integrated into MoD systems without incurring a
significant loss of performance, and moreover, that this loss
can be further minimized at the cost of deploying additional
(redundant) vehicles into the fleet. Also, our results indicate
that there is a trade-space between privacy and waiting time,
and that this trade-off can be tuned as a function of system
and/or user preferences.
Future work will consider the integration obfuscated pas-
senger pick-up locations (which can be readily obtained from
the existing framework). We will also consider the tuning of
individualized privacy levels as a function of user behavior
(as addressed in Remarks 1 and 2), or as a function of
heterogeneous user preferences (e.g., reduction of waiting
time at the cost of a loss of privacy).
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